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1. Introduction 
Gneezy, List and Wu (2006, henceforth GLW) document systematic violations of what 
they call the internality axiom (henceforth IA). Underlying most theories of risky choice, the 
IA requires that the value of any risky prospect lie between the value of that prospect’s best 
and worst outcomes.
1 Across various valuation “goods” (gift certificates and sports cards, 
time preferences and work effort), elicitation modes (pricing and choice), and implementation 
variants (hypothetical and real-stakes, laboratory and field experiments), GLW demonstrate 
that people value lotteries with intermediate probability mixes less than other people value 
the lotteries’ worst outcomes. Our results suggest that the IA violations documented by GLW 
are vulnerable to subject pool differences and that they can be completely undone by 
rewording GLW’s lottery instructions. 
 
2. Design and implementation 
GLW’s most prominent demonstration of IA violations is the valuation of gift certificates. 
We focus on GLW’s pricing tasks (see pp. 1286–1289) rather than their binary choice tasks 
(see pp. 1292–1293) because the former yield a direct valuation of the gift certificates and, 
ceteris paribus, supply higher statistical power for our analysis. 
In the seven between-subject treatments of the hypothetical pricing task, GLW’s subjects 
stated their willingness-to-pay for a lottery ticket granting a Barnes & Noble gift certificate 
worth either $50 or $100 with the following probability mixes: (1,0), (0.99,0.01), (0.6,0.4), 
(0.5,0.5), (0.4,0.6), (0.01,0.99) and (0,1). GLW found that the three lotteries with 
intermediate probability mixes were valued significantly less than the $50 gift certificate. 
While the mean (median) willingness-to-pay for the $50 gift certificate was $26.1 ($25), the 
mean (median) willingness-to-pay for the lotteries with the probability mixes (0.6, 0.4), 
(0.5,0.5) and (0.4,0.6) was only $16 ($6), $16.1 ($5) and $20.8 ($10), respectively. A 
similarly striking IA violation was reported for the real-stakes implementation.
2 
GLW hypothesize that the IA violations are caused by what they call the uncertainty 
effect, attributable to two lottery design characteristics that obstruct the application of the IA. 
 
1 The IA seemingly derives from deterministic risky choice theories but the empirical results reported 
below have implications for stochastic theories as well. 
2 While the mean (median) willingness-to-pay for the $50 gift certificate was $38 ($40), the mean 
(median) willingness-to-pay for the (0.5,0.5) lottery was only $28 ($25).  
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First, the lotteries feature non-monetary outcomes – e.g., gift certificates – and having to 
translate them into monetary outcomes may induce higher cognitive demands or perception 
of uncertainty. Second, the between-subject design does not explicitly prompt subjects to 
value the lotteries based on valuing their outcomes. GLW argue that the two characteristics 
jointly trigger a “risk and return” lottery valuation process incompatible with most theories of 
risky choice:
3 Rather than valuing the lottery outcomes, subjects are hypothesized to value 
the expectation of the outcomes’ face values and subsequently discount it for the risk 
involved in the lottery. This valuation process can indeed explain the observed IA violations 
if a high risk premium is imposed on the lotteries with intermediate probability mixes. 
Without disputing the potential relevance of GLW’s uncertainty effect argument, we 
agree with Levitt and List (2007) that striking empirical findings, such as those reported by 
GLW, deserve careful scrutiny as to whether they generalize across subject pools and 
whether they could be driven by inadvertent ambiguities of subject instructions. In fact, we 
conjecture that GLW’s results may have been triggered by their lottery instructions. Keeping 
other design characteristics intact, we therefore examine whether simplifying GLW’s lottery 
instructions alleviates the IA violation. 
Consider GLW’s instructions for subjects in the hypothetical pricing task: 
Imagine that we offer you a lottery ticket that gives you a 50 percent chance at a $50 
gift certificate for Barnes and Noble, and a 50 percent chance at a $100 gift certificate 
for Barnes and Noble. Whichever gift certificate you win is good for use within the 
next two weeks. What is the highest amount of money you would be willing to pay 
for this lottery ticket? 
 
We conjecture that by making the conceptual divide between the lottery ticket and the gift 
certificates, GLW’s instructions themselves induced higher cognitive demands or perception 
of uncertainty or both. Hence our rewording of the instructions, though formally equivalent to 
GLW’s instructions, avoids the lottery ticket formulation and simplifies the lottery by 
assigning the probabilities directly to the gift certificates’ face values: 
 
3 GLW document evidence suggesting that neither of the two characteristics can separately induce the 
IA violation. Indeed, GLW undo the IA violation when replicating the hypothetical pricing task with 
equal probabilities within subjects (see pp. 1290-91).  
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Imagine that we offer you a gift certificate for Barnes and Noble. With a chance of 50 
percent it is a certificate worth $50, and with a chance of 50 percent it is a certificate 
worth $100. Whether the gift certificate is worth $50 or $100 is determined by 
flipping a fair coin. Whichever gift certificate you receive will be good for use within 
the next two weeks. What is the highest amount of money you would be willing to 
pay for this gift certificate? 
 
By phrasing the lottery structure directly in terms of the gift certificates, our rewording 
arguably prompts subjects to value the lottery based on valuing the certificates, thus 
rendering the application of the IA more transparent. Accordingly, we hypothesize that, 
ceteris paribus, our rewording produces less violation of the IA compared to GLW’s original 
instructions.
4 
To test our hypothesis, we conduct two between-subject treatments with GLW’s and our 
reworded lottery instructions, calling the treatments Replication and Rewording, respectively. 
In either treatment, we substitute “Luxor Book Palace at Wenceslas Square” for “Barnes & 
Noble,” and we also use local-currency gift certificates worth 500CZK and 1000CZK with 
local purchasing power matching GLW’s. 
To match GLW’s sample size, we recruited thirty-two subjects for each treatment – 
students of the Institute of Economic Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles 
University, Prague.
5 Following GLW, we used a pen-and-paper design. The instructions were 
presented to subjects in Czech by the third author. Subjects first completed an anonymous 
demographic questionnaire and then received the instructions prompting them to write down 
their willingness-to-pay. Each subject received a show-up fee of 100 CZK (approximately 
$10 in purchasing power terms).
6 
 
4 Of course, an even more transparent way to represent the lotteries would be through Venn diagrams, 
as is common in contemporary lottery choice research. However, our goal was to preserve the basic 
features of GLW’s implementation and examine purely the effect of our rewording. 
5 We conducted four sessions, two each for Replication and Rewording. Since another experiment 
following this one also featured two treatments, we guarded ourselves against potential (though 
unlikely) spillover effects by conducting the two experiments in a 2x2 factorial design. 
6 The show-up fee is about ten times higher than the $1 fee used by GLW but our fee also applied to 
the follow-up experiment where the subjects earned additional $15 on average. The average total 
earnings were more than three times the average hourly wage in the Czech Republic. The sessions 
lasted about 40 minutes.  
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While we are well aware of potential behavioral differences between hypothetical and 
real-stakes implementations (e.g., Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001, Rydval and Ortmann, 2004), 
we focus on the hypothetical pricing task for which we can provide an alternative book store 
that is as well-known and has similar product variety as Barnes & Noble.
7 We also 
conveniently circumvent the potential confounds introduced in GLW’s real pricing task 
through their use of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) elicitation mechanism. We further 
note that only one out of twenty subjects in GLW’s real-stakes implementation was randomly 
selected and paid based on his/her answer, making it a rather low-stakes implementation (in 
expected-value terms) resembling a hypothetical implementation. 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 displays our willingness-to-pay (WTP) data and below it our statistical tests. We 
get strikingly higher WTP in Replication compared to GLW’s results. Relative to the face 
value of the worst gift certificate – 500CZK for our case and $50 for GLW – the 95% 
confidence interval for WTP is (78.46%, 102.17%) in Replication, compared to merely 
(18.83%, 45.66%) in GLW’s hypothetical pricing task. 
While our implementation is tightly in line with GLW’s, including the purchasing power 
of our gift certificates, we naturally cannot rule out implementation differences stemming 
from experimenter effects, language effects, or subject pool differences. Among a multitude 
of potential reasons for the differences in WTP, our subjects might have a greater affection 
for reading, or fewer of them might have had trouble understanding the lottery 
implementation in Replication compared to GLW’s Chicago students. 
Indeed, we find that WTP in both Replication and Rewording is significantly positively 
affected by subjects’ year of study, while WTP is unrelated to their age and gender. 
Nevertheless, we demonstrate in Table 1 that our results stand regardless of the influence of 
the demographic characteristics on WTP. 
Our key result is the effect of our rewording on WTP. Particularly, WTP is significantly 
higher in Rewording than in Replication. The upward shift in WTP is so strong that the 95% 
 
7 Our book store, Luxor Book Palace, is one of the largest bookstores in the Czech Republic, located 
within two-minute walking distance of the experiment’s site and the subjects’ University (see below 
for details) and also allowing online purchases. Note that instead of Barnes & Noble, GLW’s real-
stakes implementation used a smaller local bookstore of unknown quality.  
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confidence interval for WTP in Rewording lies completely above the face value of the 
500CZK gift certificate. To the extent that transfers in cash are preferred to those in kind, our 
subjects would value the 500CZK gift certificate less than 500CZK. Hence our Rewording 
essentially eliminates the possibility of the IA violation documented by GLW.
8 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
GLW show that when lotteries involve non-monetary outcomes and people are not 
explicitly prompted to value them based on valuing the outcomes, lotteries with equal or 
similar probabilities are often valued less than their worst outcomes. Our results for 
Replication suggest that this IA violation is vulnerable to subject pool differences. Our results 
for Rewording suggest that the IA violation can be completely undone by rewording GLW’s 
lottery instructions in a way that arguably makes the application of the IA more transparent. 
We do not dispute that GLW’s lottery design may involve high cognitive demands or 
perception of uncertainty or both, which may trigger a valuation process incompatible with 
risky choice theories. After all, like GLW, we did not trace the valuation process that our 
subjects actually used. However, our results suggest that at least part of what GLW call the 
uncertainty effect might be triggered by their lottery instructions obstructing the application 
of the IA. 
We conjecture that GLW’s instructions might have been misinterpreted as describing 
a compound lottery featuring zero outcome(s) and uncertainty. For instance, some subjects 
might have misinterpreted GLW’s task as featuring two lotteries with unknown probabilities: 
either a (0.5, 0.5) lottery with outcomes being the $50 gift certificate and zero, or a (0.5, 0.5) 
lottery with outcomes being the $100 gift certificate and zero. Alternatively, some subjects 
might have misinterpreted GLW’s task as featuring a 50% probability of winning one of the 
two gift certificates with unknown probabilities, and a 50% probability of receiving zero. 
Hastie and Dawes (2001) refer to such misinterpretations as triggering “ambiguous 
uncertainty.” The anomalously low lottery valuation documented by GLW might therefore 
 
8 In fact, the Replication confidence interval also marginally contains the face value of the 500CZK 
certificate, so if subjects value the 500CZK gift certificate less than 500CZK, even our Replication 
would be unlikely to produce the IA violation documented by GLW (at reasonable significance 
levels).  
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stem from ambiguity aversion, similarly to a common interpretation of the Ellsberg’s paradox 
(Ellsberg, 1961). 
Our results contribute to a bigger picture that has emerged in psychology where verbally 
described tasks (word problems) similar to GLW’s are ubiquitously used in research on 
probabilistic or logical reasoning. Many psychologists have emphasized that a primary source 
of ambiguity in word problems stems from the use of ambiguous natural language terms and 
experimenters’ violations of conversational norms (e.g., Adler, 1991; Hilton, 1995; Evans, 
2002; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton and Naderer, 1991;  but see also Mellers, Hertwig and 
Kahneman, 2001). To interpret people’s behavior as violating rules of logic, probability 
theory or axioms of rational choice theory, the experimenter needs to assume that the word 
problem represents nothing more than instantiations of normative rules. However, word 
problems come with the semantic and pragmatic ambiguity of natural language. 
Consequently, unlike experimenters who know the meaning of the key terms in logical and 
probabilistic word problems such as and, or, if-then and probability, experimental subjects 
have to infer the meaning. Crucially, natural language frequently offers multiple meanings, 
and to determine the intended one, people appear to use conversational maxims (i.e., Grice’s 
1975, 1989, theory of conversational reasoning, based on the premise that the communicator 
attempts to meet certain general standards of communication). In inferring the intended 
meaning of words or utterances, experimental subjects may arrive at interpretations that 
diverge from those of experimenters (e.g., Evans, 2002; Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999; 
Politzer and Noveck, 1991). Thus experimenters, in simply equating their and subjects’ 
understanding of the task, may erroneously interpret the subjects’ behavior as irrational (see 
Harrison 2005).  
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Table 1: Willingness-to-pay (WTP) in Replication and Rewording 
  Session  WTP (in CZK) in ascending order for each treatment (WTP ≥ 500 in bold)   
1  100 300 300 300 400 400 450 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 550 600
Replication 
3  250 250 250 300 300 300 300 400 500 600 600 600 650 730 750 770
2  300 300 375 500 500 500 500 500 600 600 650 650 700 700 750 750
Rewording 
4  250 499 500 500 500 500 500 500 550 600 600 620 650 700 700 720
 
     Replication Rewording 
Mean WTP  451.56  555.13 
Median WTP  500.00  525.00 
Standard deviation of WTP  164.44  129.35 
95% C.I. for the means without demographic controls  (392.28, 510.85)  (508.49, 601.76) 
95% C.I. for the means with significant demographic controls  (388.33, 507.28)  (518.41, 599.36) 
95% binomial exact C.I. for the medians  (300.00, 500.00)  (500.00, 650.00) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test  Z = 2.56, p-value = 0.011 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  KS = 0.34, p-value = 0.045 
t-test without demographic controls t  = 2.80, p-value = 0.0068 
t-test with significant demographic controls t  = 3.07, p-value = 0.0032 
t-test with all demographic controls t  = 3.13, p-value = 0.0027 
 
Notes: Raw WTP data (top) are followed by summary statistics and two-sided tests (bottom). 
Wherever applicable, confidence intervals (C.I.) and tests are based on heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. The second C.I. pair and the last two t-tests are adjusted for the 
influence of demographics. Session effects, higher-order moments and interactions of 
demographics, as well as their interactions with the treatments, are individually and jointly 
insignificant at the 5% significance level. 
 
 